Urgent Gaps in Addressing Internet Censorship and Fragmentation

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Statement by Michel Lambert, eQualitie for the Policy Network on Internet fragmentation (PNIF) at IGF 2025, June 27, Oslo, Norway

 

Thanks you for the invitation

eQualitie is a Canadian not-for-profit organization developing open-source technologies to support digital and community resilience, particularly in environments affected by censorship, surveillance, and network isolation.

We run the SplinterCon international conference series, which brings together researchers, developers, tech entrepreneurs, and internet freedom advocates to confront the growing challenges of internet fragmentation—often referred to as the splinternet. The event examines emerging realities like national internets information control and censorship, while showcasing innovative tools that help people circumvent restrictions.

As such, we work directly with communities affected by network shutdowns, filtering, and targeted digital repression.

From our perspective, there are two urgent and under-addressed gaps that demand immediate attention from our community

 

The first gap :  The Political Normalization of Network Control

Tools of censorship, surveillance, and fragmentation are no longer exceptional—they are becoming normalized instruments of governance. We are witnessing a global shift where controlling internet access is increasingly equated with sovereign state power.

This is not happening on the margins—it’s happening at scale.

And yet, even in this week of high-level discussions on Internet governance, censorship and shutdowns are largely absent from the agenda. AI has dominated conversations, while real-time human rights emergencies are being overlooked:

  • No formal discussion on Iran’s recent full-scale shutdown affecting nearly 90 million people.
  • No serious engagement with the ongoing restriction of Palestinians to 2G networks—a digital ghettoization that has persisted for years.

These 2 examples are not isolated incidents. They are part of a global pattern that will continue—unless we act.

Efforts like the Best Practice Forum on Protecting Core Internet Resources in Contexts of Conflict are welcome, and we intend to support them. But they must be scaled, deepened, and grounded in reality.

 

If we want to “leave no one behind,” that mantra must apply even when governments decide to shut down the internet for political purposes.

In this context, the Global Digital Compact (GDC), while framed as a roadmap for rights-based internet governance, risks in fact to legitimate fragmentation. By enshrining national sovereignty over domestic internets, it may inadvertently give cover to state-led shutdowns and repression.  This need to be adressed!

We must ensure that embedding human rights in digital governance is more than rhetorical. We need mechanisms that make it more difficult—and more costly—for governments to shut down the internet.

 

A Case Study: Iran’s Controlled Fragmentation

In the last 10 days, Iran has demonstrated a new level of sophistication in state-controlled network fragmentation. As the director of Project Ainita put it:

“We’ve had full shutdowns four times since 2009. Each time the regime learned. Now, after 16 years of trial and error, they can manage it successfully.”

Through the National Information Network (NIN), Iran has ensured domestic access to state services, banks, and internal messaging—even during complete global disconnection. From outside the country, families and friends are cut off. WhatsApp, Signal, DNS resolution, even simple messaging platforms become inaccessible.

THIS IS FULL FRAGMENTATION

But some tools worked:

  • Toosheh: A satellite-based filecasting system saw a surge in users, with content shifting to real-time news and increasing in frequency.
  • Ceno Browser: A peer-to-peer tool using BitTorrent and Ouinet continued to distribute cached content across Iranian provinces.
  • Matrix Servers: eQualitie and partners deployed Matrix homeservers within Iran’s infrastructure to enable secure internal communication.
  • Delta Chat: Continued to function through local SMTP servers, though filtering is increasing.

These tools must be promoted before shutdowns happen—which requires investment for preparedness, and continuous innovation.

 

This brings us to the Second gap! :  The Collapse of Funding for Internet Freedom

It is no secret that the United States has been the primary funder of global internet freedom efforts, contributing nearly $250 million annually. Recent estimates suggest that up to 80% of this funding is being cut for 2025 and beyond.

This leaves a massive gap at the worst possible time.

Without immediate action from other governments—Canada, EU member states, and other allies—we risk losing essential infrastructure, tools, and networks that allow people to stay online and safe.

In the short term, this means:

  • Stabilizing funding for critical tools before they disappear
  • Supporting local help desks, training hubs, and adapted versions of censorship circumvention tools
  • Mapping the real impact of the funding cuts to guide smart, emergency-level decisions in the next six months
  • Cutting red tape—this is not the moment for bureaucratic delays

In the long term, this means:

  • Treating digital resilience as essential infrastructure
  • Supporting open, interoperable, and sovereign alternatives to Big Tech
  • Mainstreaming encryption and privacy as fundamental rights
  • Embedding resilience strategies—including tools, training, and rapid response—into foreign policy, humanitarian assistance, and national innovation funding

Conclusion

Digital shutdowns are no longer rare or extreme—they are part of the digital political playbook. If we fail to take them seriously, we will continue to see vulnerable communities cut off, silenced, and left behind.

We need resources and accountability mechanisms to meet this moment. The future of a truly open, resilient, and rights-based internet depends on it.

 

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